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Military Innovation Studies: multidisciplinary or lacking discipline? 
Introduction 
Military innovation is an important field of academic enquiry which has the potential to make a 
major pure and applied contribution to research across a number of disciplines. At present, the 
influence of military innovation scholarship is minimal outside of a very specific scholar-practitioner 
community working within the field itself. This relatively niche status within security studies and, to 
a lesser extent, military history is discordant with the field’s engagement with, and relevance to, 
other disciplines. Core aspects of military innovation studies’ research agenda such as the dynamics 
of organisational culture, the challenges of institutional learning and the relative influence of 
internal and external factors upon change have traditionally been acknowledged as important 
themes within other social science disciplines such as management, sociology, education, 
anthropology and psychology yet research into the drivers of military innovation remains, at best, 
peripheral to each discipline. Further, many of the theoretical constructs now used to explain how 
such factors influence military innovation were imported from those disciplines so it seems puzzling 
that the resultant research has not had a much wider multidisciplinary impact. This article 
demonstrates why military innovation is important to a broader research community within the 
humanities and social sciences whilst answering why this has not been the case to date. It analyses 
the recent evolution of military innovation theory, posing important questions about its current 
state of health and discussing its future direction. While the article commends the increasingly rich 
and diverse literature in the field it also sounds a warning for the consequences of rushing seemingly 
applicable theory into the corpus before going on to recommend avenues for further research. 
Three issues are explored in depth: philosophical tensions between the main approaches to military 
innovation, the challenges of a multidisciplinary approach and the utility of viewing military 
innovation studies as a field in its own right. It will conclude by looking to the future; suggesting 
ways of rising to the challenges faced and increasing its multidisciplinary impact. 
There are several reasons why it is important to address these issues now. It is a decade since Adam 
Grissom wrote an influential article, ‘The future of military innovation studies’1. In it, Grissom 
surveyed the field, categorised its scholarship and highlighted gaps in the research agenda. Since 
Grissom’s article there has been an explosion of new and exciting research, partly in answer to his 
call for more research into bottom-up adaptation but mainly in response to the challenges of 
learning appropriate lessons from the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. Grissom caught the 
zeitgeist as many scholars and practitioners had already begun to respond to the issues exposed by 
conducting cutting edge research on bottom-up and horizontal innovation, the significance of 
strategic culture and the peculiarities of institutional learning in the context of military 
organisations. If the themes were not new, the increasingly sophisticated multidisciplinary character 
of the research certainly was. In consequence, though recent research in military innovation has 
enriched the field of study enormously by adding a wealth of new empirical studies and drawing 
upon an array of concepts and theories from multiple disciplines, it has also become extremely 
intricate and even contradictory. This is not necessarily a bad thing, of course: increased complexity 
can be a mark of greater sophistication. However, it can also obfuscate and confuse if left 
unquestioned. 
                                                          
1
 Adam Grissom, ‘The future of military innovation studies’, Journal of Strategic Studies 29/5 (2006), 905-934. 
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As the remarkable growth of the field over the past decade attests, we have experienced a period 
particularly conducive to research into military innovation but this is not guaranteed to continue. 
Much of the cutting-edge research is closely associated with, or even dependent upon, an 
unprecedented degree of openness from militaries to academic scrutiny. This openness reflects a 
strong desire on the part of these (predominantly) Western militaries to better understand their 
own organisational cultures in order to adapt and innovate more effectively. However, as the threat 
environment transforms it is not a given that practitioner interest in academic scholarship about 
military innovation will remain and this could have profound consequences for the future of the 
field. Though the imperative for militaries to learn, adapt and predict remains in both war and 
peace, there is a natural tendency for military organisations to pay the most attention to the 
dynamics of innovation when they either perceive themselves ill-prepared for an imminent threat or 
ill-suited to cope with an existing one: basically, when the character of a given conflict makes them 
feel most vulnerable. For these reasons it seems an appropriate point to pause, reflect and re-
orientate.  
Military innovation: a vibrant field of study 
There is no question that the past fifteen years has been an immensely productive time for research 
into military innovation. Overall, the breadth and quality of scholarship has been outstanding and 
research productivity has only intensified since Grissom’s 2006 article. Whether this burst of 
research energy was inspired by Grissom or simply captured by him is an interesting question. The 
answer, of course, is a bit of both and this is illuminating because, on the one hand, Grissom 
identified gaps in the field and encouraged others to fill them but, on the other, Western militaries’ 
increasing willingness to engage with the academic community to understand and learn from the 
wars they were fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan provided opportunities for unparalleled access to 
the subjects themselves. The resulting rich vein of research is discussed below. 
In his survey of the field, Grissom identified four primary schools of thought on military innovation 
focussing on four distinct themes: civil-military relations, inter-service politics, intra-service politics 
and cultural influences.2 First, the civil-military relations school is largely associated with the work of 
Barry R Posen, often cited as the father of the field of military innovation studies. His 1984 work, The 
Sources of Military Doctrine3, posits that the relationship between empowered external agents and 
creative insiders (‘mavericks’) defines the character and degree of innovation. Posen’s work set the 
tone for inter-disciplinary research in the field, using as it does three historical case studies of inter-
war military doctrine in Britain, France and Germany to test his thesis. Many others, notably 
Deborah Avant,4 have built on this work with compelling empirical studies and it remains at the 
heart of much military innovation theory today. Second, inter-service politics models, often viewed 
                                                          
2
 Grissom, ‘The future of military innovation studies’, 908. For a different approach to surveying the field, see 
Suzanne C Nielsen, An Army Transformed: The U.S. Army’s Post-Vietnam Recovery and the Dynamics of Change 
in Military Organizations, (US Army War College, Carlisle PA : Strategic Studies Institute Letort Paper 2010), 5-
33. 
3
 Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars, 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1984). 
4
 Deborah D. Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell UP 1994). 
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as stemming from the work of Andrew Bacevich5 though actually not uncommon in other studies of 
the development of US weapons programmes during the Cold War,6 emphasises the way in which 
inter-service rivalry influences both the type of innovation and perceptions of conflict itself. Third, 
intra-service politics paradigms contend that competition between branches within a service is the 
critical driver of innovation. This school of thought is largely  linked to the work of Stephen P Rosen’s 
1991 book Winning the Next War7 which argued that successful innovation is heavily reliant on what 
he terms the ‘alignment’ of leadership, branches and institutional structures. Rosen argued that ‘a 
new theory of victory’ emerges when an intra-service ideological struggle is won and wider support 
garnered. Others developed some of Rosen’s themes further8  and the concept of innovation being 
linked to a ‘new theory of victory’ entered the vocabulary of the field more generally. Finally, the 
fourth ‘school’ is perhaps more accurately described as a collection of related approaches privileging 
cultural factors. Flowing from work on strategic and organisational culture and often drawing upon 
sociology and anthropology, cultural approaches to understanding innovation have become 
increasingly prevalent with scholars such as Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff bringing studies of the 
cultural dynamics that influence innovation into the mainstream literature. Though cultural studies 
were not unknown9 in the field of military innovation, Farrell’s substantial body of work in particular 
both inspired and reflected emerging scholarship that actively pushed the previous boundaries of 
the field. Farrell and Terriff’s collaborative work posited that innovation was inspired in three ways: 
senior leadership could reshape culture and thus drive innovation, it could be forced by external 
shock or it could evolve as a result of emulation of other professional militaries.10 Since then, 
scholarship that has privileged, or at the very least recognised, the importance of organisational and 
strategic culture has largely dominated the field.11 
                                                          
5
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(Washington DC: Brookings Institute 1997); Suzanne C Nielsen, Preparing for War: The Dynamics of Peacetime 
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 See for instance, Elizabeth Kier, ‘Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars’, International 
Security 19/4, (Spring 1995); Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between the 
Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP 1997); Andrew F Krepinevich, The Army in Vietnam (Baltimore MD: Johns 
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in demonstrating the importance of organisational culture to national security decision-making, shaping the 
field of study ever since. Graham Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston, MA: 
Little Brown 1971). See also Morton Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington DC: 
Brookings Institute 1974). 
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 Theo G. Farrell and Terry Terriff, The Sources of Military Change: culture, politics, technology (Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner, 2002); Theo Farrell, Norms of War: Cultural Beliefs and Modern Conflict (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner 2005); Terry Terriff, ‘Innovate or Die: Organizational Culture and the Origins of Maneuver Warfare in 
the U.S. Marine Corps’, Journal of Strategic Studies 29/3 (2006) 475-503; Theo Farrell, ‘The dynamics of British 
military transformation’, International Affairs 84/4 (2008) 777-807.  
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 See for instance, Dima Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation: The Impact of Cultural Factors on the 
Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the US, and Israel (Stanford: Stanford University Press 2010); Farrell and 
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Why has this been the case? First, cultural approaches always had obvious potential and this has 
been fulfilled by the predominantly high quality of recent scholarship. Cultural studies have proved 
particularly adept at addressing some conspicuous gaps in our understanding of how militaries 
change, notably Grissom’s call to redress the imbalance between the primarily top-down emphasis 
of all four schools and bottom-up and horizontal studies12 and the somewhat surprising paucity of 
academic scholarship on ‘adaptation’ in conflict.13 The number of studies of bottom-up and 
horizontal innovation, especially of field-level adaptation, has grown rapidly in the past decade. In 
terms of contemporary operations, Theo Farrell, again, undertook important studies of British army 
adaptation in Afghanistan;14 James A Russell wrote highly influential studies of US Army adaptation 
in Iraq15; Foley, Griffin and McCartney wrote a comparative study of British and American 
‘Transformation in Contact’,16 and a plethora of excellent studies of adaptation in different armed 
forces emerged.17 Importantly, works looking at the other side of the hill, so to speak, explored the 
dynamics of adaptation and innovation from asymmetric or ‘hybrid’ state and non-state adversaries 
such as Iran, Hamas or Hezbollah.18  Conversely , scholars such as Bjerga and Haaland studied 
innovation outside of conflict, in their case the evolution of joint doctrine in Norway, illustrating how 
some manifestations of innovation in ‘small states’ can be unrelated to operational effectiveness 
whilst still serving important, even strategic, purposes.19 In sum, though it would be inappropriate to 
pigeon-hole all of the above scholarship as cultural studies, the importance of cultural factors to the 
form and function of military innovation is evident in all of it and now infuses much of the best 
literature in the field. 
Recent research has been receptive of constructive criticism, indicating a healthy and energetic 
discipline. For instance, scholars very quickly began to critique the initial work on bottom-up and 
horizontal innovation. Anthony King20 and others queried the level of successful adaptation and 
genuine change in the British army’s approach to Afghanistan. Sergio Catignani pointed out flaws in 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Terriff, The Sources of Military Change. For a range of different approaches by authors in the field see for 
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Stanley (eds.), Creating Military Power: The Sources of Military Effectiveness (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press 2007); Adamsky and Bjerga (eds.), Contemporary Military Innovation; Farrell, Osinga and Russell (eds.), 
Military Adaptation in Afghanistan. 
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 Itai Brun and Carmit Valensi, ‘The Revolution in Military Affairs of the ‘Other Side’’, in Adamsky and Bjerga 
(eds.), Contemporary Military Innovation, 107-129. 
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 Kjell Inge Bjerga and Torunn Laugen Haaland, ‘Doctrinal Innovation in Small States’, in Adamsky and Bjerga 
(eds.), Contemporary Military Innovation, 83-106. 
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 Anthony King, ‘Understanding the Helmand Campaign: British Military Operations in Afghanistan’, 
International Affairs 86/2 (2010) 311-332; David Betz and Anthony Cormack, ‘Hot War, Cold Comfort: a less 
optimistic take on the British military in Afghanistan’, RUSI Journal 154/4 (2009) 26-9. 
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the assumptions of Farrell, et.al that informal networks of battlefield adaptation were necessarily 
evidence of institutionalised learning: demonstrating that it may be the case that excellent lower-
level adaptation actually reduces the imperative for embedded institutional learning.21 Serena’s 
work on US military adaptation makes a related point22 and Nina Kollars’ comparative analysis of 
gun-truck adaptation in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrates how effective ‘soldier-led’ adaptation to 
specific challenges can produce ad hoc networks capable of dealing effectively with the task at hand 
without necessarily delivering more permanent bottom-up innovation: efficient but not sufficient, in 
her words.23 Raphael Marcus’ recent work on Israeli battlefield adaptation in response to its conflict 
with Hezbollah draws several of these research strands together, examining the IDF’s attempts to 
institutionalise what had previously largely been ad-hoc learning processes through more formal 
tactical knowledge management mechanisms.24  
Second, timing, it would seem, remains everything as the research agendas of cultural approaches 
have synchronised with those of militaries themselves over the past decade. Though greater 
academic interest in both strategic and military culture was evident from the mid-1990s, reflecting 
the ‘critical turn’ within IR theory more generally, critical approaches only really impacted 
meaningfully on the field of military innovation studies a decade later when their practical utility 
became evident to an influential scholar-practitioner community that understandably tends to 
privilege applied research. As this community began to re-appraise the drivers of successful military 
transformations in the face of the nightmarishly complex conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan so the 
focus turned first outward to apportion blame externally (usually to poor strategy from civilian 
leaders) but then inwards to the relationships between organisational cultures and strategic choices. 
The danger of such effective externalisation of blame was always that it would result in a failure to 
learn appropriate lessons so it was important that the introspection, when it came, was thorough, 
robust and honest.25 Al Qaeda, Iraq, Afghanistan and the rise of Islamic State (or Daesh) raised all 
sorts of difficult questions about the ability and willingness of militaries to adapt successfully to 
twenty-first century threats. Strategic culture literature became increasingly important to the field of 
military innovation because it looked both up and out from the organisation (i.e. how does the 
military’s culture influence strategic behaviour of, predominantly, the state?) and down and in to the 
organisation (i.e. how does its strategic culture shape its own choices, how does this reinforce 
attitude and behaviour and how can one induce meaningful change?).26 Thus, cultural approaches to 
understanding how and why military institutions innovate were remarkably well-placed to exploit 
the unprecedented levels of access that many of those militaries subsequently granted and to win 
the related research funding. 
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6 
 
Finally, if the past decade has been marked by the rise to prominence of cultural approaches, it has 
been equally notable for the increasingly multidisciplinary character of the field. Though the majority 
of the scholarship remains rooted in political science, there is also a long interdisciplinary tradition of 
historians engaging meaningfully with the theory of military innovation, thus providing a much 
richer, healthier body of knowledge. This tradition has continued and strengthened with historians 
embracing theoretical advances in the field and combining them with high quality historical 
research. 27  Further, recent advances reflect the willingness of military innovation researchers to 
draw upon other social sciences, particularly with regard to group dynamics, management theory 
and organisational learning. Invaluable insights have been drawn from disciplines such as 
anthropology, sociology, education and management with relevant concepts and theories from each 
making their way into the literature. Most obviously, cultural studies draw on anthropology, 
psychology and sociology whilst education and management have been used to develop conceptual 
toolboxes to better understand the theory and practice of organisational learning. However, though 
these trends are indicative of a vibrant, growing field, there are a number of significant challenges 
that need to be met if it is to continue to flourish. 
Three inter-related themes have emerged as recurrent problems within the extant military 
innovation literature. First, proponents of Grissom’s four ‘schools’ seem remarkably conflict-averse; 
offering insights to complement and enhance each other’s analyses rather than setting out their 
cases for being genuinely competitive explanatory models of military innovation. In many ways this 
is an admirable trait in the field of innovation studies, bucking the general trend for vicious academic 
in-fighting over often irrelevant nuance but it has arguably stunted the growth of the field by 
glossing over more profound epistemological differences between approaches to innovation and 
thereby skewing the research agendas. Second, the increasingly multi-disciplinary character of the 
field has expanded its horizons and added greater substance but has exacerbated pre-existing 
methodological and philosophical tensions between disciplines. Further, the highly selective use and 
interpretation of terminology, concepts, models and theoretical frameworks from other disciplines 
has exposed the field’s vulnerability to intertextual issues. Finally, the breadth of scholarship on 
military innovation coupled with the range of multidisciplinary approaches that are now drawn upon 
raises a much larger question about the continued utility of viewing military innovation as a field in 
its own right. 
Military innovation: a conservative field? 
Given its current predominance one would expect the ‘Cultural School’ to have articulated some 
powerful arguments for the primacy of strategic and organisational culture not just in shaping 
innovation but in defining the very terms in which militaries perceive the changing character of 
conflict itself. Certainly, some of the strongest proponents of the influence of culture demonstrate 
how culture exerts that influence across each of the components of fighting power: moral, physical 
and conceptual. Dima Adamsky’s comparative study of military innovation in the US, Israel and 
Russia is an excellent example here.28 Adamsky’s ground-breaking work demonstrates how the 
distinct strategic cultures of each state not only led to different technological pathways but to 
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 See for instance, Jonathan Boff, ‘Combined Arms during the Hundred Days Campaign, August-November 
1918’, War in History 17/4 (2010) 459-478; Robert T Foley, ‘Dumb donkeys or cunning foxes? Learning in the 
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 Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation. 
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divergent understandings of the significance of those technological breakthroughs. As Adamsky 
demonstrates, strategic culture can be so influential as to induce an almost completely inverse 
relationship between the ability to conceive, develop and deliver technological breakthroughs and 
the ability to recognise their import. While it is the United States that delivers revolutionary 
battlespace capabilities based on the much wider revolution in information technology (that it is also 
leading), it is the Soviet Union, least capable of keeping up, that is first to recognise that these 
breakthroughs mark a fundamental change in the character of conflict: a revolution in military affairs 
(RMA). Israel, meanwhile, is the first to apply these capabilities directly but does so in the most 
narrowly battlefield (or tactical) manner. What Adamsky brilliantly demonstrates is how strategic 
culture imbued each military with particular characteristics that shaped the development, use and, 
ultimately, perception of the very nature of the technology. Equally important, it illustrates how 
each culture has distinct advantages and disadvantages: there is no such thing as the perfect military 
institution. Trade-offs are embedded in the very fabric of all military organisations because their 
strategic cultures are determined by choices made in response to constantly evolving complex 
relationships between the international environment, the state, society and themselves. 
However, Adamsky’s work is interesting for another reason: one that points to a major problem 
within the field. Despite demonstrating the profound impact strategic culture can have on strategic 
choice, Adamsky, like almost everyone else, stops short of ascribing independent causal power to 
cultural factors. In fact, he goes out of his way to emphasise the compatibility of his study with ones 
privileging external factors: in theoretical terms, the most traditional positivist explanatory 
theories.29 This is not a criticism of Adamsky but it is revealing because it is representative of the vast 
majority of work in the field, including my own. Though cultural approaches obviously accord culture 
greater status in shaping innovation they do not challenge the primacy of conventionally conceived 
explanations of what drives innovation. Williamson Murray’s 2011 study of military adaptation in 
war acknowledges a great deal of commonality between the general drivers of innovation in peace 
and those of adaptation in war but argues convincingly that the intense pressures of war privileges 
obvious traditional drivers (operational necessity and technological advances) for adaptation to be 
successful. Organisational culture is important to Murray but in a supplementary capacity: “the 
organizational culture of particular military organizations formed during peacetime will determine 
how effectively they will adapt to the actual conditions they will face in war.”30 Farrell’s introduction 
to Military Adaptation in Afghanistan (2013) agrees that operational challenges and new 
technologies are the drivers of adaptation in warfare, according strategic culture shaping status only 
in his analytical framework.31 Even Elizabeth Kier, who states categorically that ‘culture has causal 
autonomy’ subsequently qualifies her argument, undermining the case for the centrality of culture 
and defending the continued utility of structural and functional analyses.32 Implicit adherence to this 
hierarchy typifies cultural approaches suggesting that even scholarship ostensibly grounded in more 
radical epistemological positions gravitates towards the middle-ground and declared compatibility 
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with traditional theories.33 This is superficially counter-intuitive given the current prevalence of 
cultural approaches to understanding the dynamics of military change. However, if one views it as 
indicative of a theoretical conservatism partially induced by the heavily practical focus of the field it 
becomes more comprehensible. 
Ironically, scholarship bearing many or all of the hallmarks of critical approaches to theory34 has 
been successfully integrated into the field, and arguably come to dominate it, precisely because it 
has not fundamentally challenged the utility of other schools. This is remarkable because if any of 
Grissom’s four competing schools should constitute an existential threat to the others, it is the 
cultural one. Instead, cultural approaches have emphasised their compatibility not only with intra- 
and inter-service approaches, which already argued that the internal dynamics of military 
organisations were crucial to innovation, but also with the seminal work of Posen which appears 
philosophically furthest removed. This accommodation of other perspectives created considerable 
room for the exploration of cultural drivers without directly contradicting the central hypotheses of 
the other schools but has inevitably constrained the cultural, or more broadly critical, research 
agenda. As each of the other schools assumes the existence of an external reality that sets the 
requirement for innovation, if not the conditions under which it develops or its ultimate form, they 
are ultimately highly traditional, positivist explanatory models. Cultural approaches have largely 
accepted, or ignored, this point and that creates a significant tension in the work which stunts 
growth in the field because it means that strongly positivist, and largely reductionist systemic  IR 
theories  have rather neatly assimilated cultural approaches within their broader epistemological 
framework. 
Perversely, the price paid for the current predominance of the cultural research agenda is 
subordinate paradigmatic status within military innovation studies. Put simply, the vast majority of 
cultural scholarship accepts that culture lacks independent causal power. Cultural approaches to 
military innovation therefore mainly conform to theoretically conservative approaches to strategic 
culture more generally: providing value-added explanations of strategic behaviour that are 
epiphenomenal, or at best secondary, to pre-existing, firmly positivist IR theories.35 Studies such as 
Adamsky’s push the boundaries further, demonstrating culture’s capacity to act as a conceptual 
vehicle to understand aspects of behaviour that would otherwise defy explanation but still tend not 
to confer the status of an independent variable with equal or superior explanatory power to 
traditional theories.36 They therefore remain very firmly positivist and, ultimately, subordinate. Little 
or no military innovation literature takes more radical critical, constructivist or even entirely post-
positivist approaches by ascribing independent, superior or unquantifiable influence to military 
culture despite the fact that key theorists have robustly defended its capacity to do so in the past.37 
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In summary, though the ‘critical turn’ within the field of military innovation has been integral to the 
rise to prominence of cultural approaches the ambition of its research agenda has been severely 
curtailed by its own theoretical conservatism. 
Most likely, this gravitation to the theoretical middle-ground is the result of the aforementioned 
applied character of the field. Most military innovation scholars are inherently practice-focussed 
because they routinely work, or have forged good working relationships with, the military and other 
relevant agencies. Almost all of the research has been undertaken by serving or former officers, 
defence think tanks and academics closely associated with professional military education (PME) or 
defence policy. This overlapping scholar-practitioner community has both the greatest access to 
military organisations and a vested interest in understanding the dynamics of change and innovation 
within those organisations. It is unsurprising, therefore, that its research outputs not only seek to 
understand the drivers of innovation but to explain their dynamics and apply the knowledge gained. 
As research funding also often focusses on answering practical questions about how to improve 
institutional learning, the scholarship naturally asks the ‘what’ and the ‘why’ questions in order to 
provide recommendations, or at least insights, about ‘how’. There is therefore an inherent structural 
bias within the field toward applied research that discourages overly theoretical scholarship.38 This is 
important not only because it exposes a gap in the field’s own theoretical literature but because that 
gap is reflective of much bigger, on-going debates within International Security Studies and its 
parent discipline of International Relations (IR) about the relative strengths of competing (and still 
dominant) positivist IR theories, the explanatory power of ‘middle ground’ constructivism and 
critical theory and the practical utility of their more radical manifestations as well as the relevance of 
entirely post-positivist approaches.39 Addressing a theory gap in our own field could therefore make 
a major contribution to wider disciplinary debates. 
Identification of this theory gap is not to accuse innovation scholars of lacking theoretical grounding, 
nor is it a criticism of the quality of the various theories of innovation that they have advanced, but it 
is appropriate to acknowledge that there is a natural tendency within the field to privilege practical 
utility over theoretical purity and that this tendency has a significant constraining effect on the 
research agenda. Military innovation scholars tend to be of a type in epistemological terms. Despite 
protestations to the contrary, “they turn out, in the final analysis, to be ambivalent about how much 
independent explanatory power cultural variables have”40 producing some outstanding but 
philosophically narrow research. This narrowness opens the door to accusations that the research is 
niche, ‘simply policy-work’ or academically less rigorous; none of which being true but all hard to 
defend against. If it is to do so, the field needs fresh blood to keep it intellectually honest, push 
boundaries much further, eschew the comfort of the theoretical middle-ground and provoke 
arguments about the fundamentals. In summary, while it is perhaps unfair to label individual pieces 
of scholarship as ‘conservative’ when the quality of research has been so high and the field has come 
so far, it is a justifiable criticism that military innovation studies’ applied bent has focussed 
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competition for theoretical predominance on the centre ground. The positive effect of this has been 
a reduction in conflict over new thinking that encourages a high degree of receptiveness to 
alternative perspectives.  The negative one has been to mask greater philosophical divisions 
between more radical expressions of these perspectives, thereby limiting the ambition of the 
research agenda. Such a cautious approach to theorising is understandable in an applied field but is 
self-defeating because it engenders an overly restrictive relationship between theory and practice.41 
To use a military innovation metaphor, research and development (R&D) founded on such a 
relationship will always produce a better battleship but never the aircraft carrier that supersedes it, 
changing the face of battle at sea. 
Military innovation studies: a confused field? 
If we need to reflect on the compatibility of the IR foundations of the literature we definitely need 
more rigorous analysis of the multidisciplinary tools now in use. The field’s increasingly 
multidisciplinary character is a tremendous strength but also makes it vulnerable to the 
misinterpretation and consequent misapplication of nascent conceptual tools derived from the 
other disciplines. It is of enormous benefit that a broad range of relevant social sciences are being 
drawn upon but the highly selective use of theoretical concepts or even entire models is 
problematic. This problem is compounded by two issues. First, though multiple disciplines are being 
used, the field remains dominated by political scientists and historians. Though some 
anthropologists have rather controversially worked with the military, it is only really a select group 
of sociologists who have engaged directly with the study of military innovation. Second, the applied 
mentality of the field, discussed above, encourages the integration of promising concepts or 
theoretical frameworks from multiple disciplines into the extant literature comparatively quickly 
without necessarily much reflection on where they fit or what the implications are for the pre-
existing corpus. 
The effect of these two issues is highly problematic. Without any significant academic discourse with 
target disciplines, the influx of concepts and theories cannot be said to be truly multidisciplinary: it is 
borrowing rather than sharing. Coupled with the impetus to incorporate new ideas quickly, the 
field’s vulnerability to flawed multi-disciplinary research is comparatively high. To use a literary term, 
there is an intertextual problem because the texts being referenced are not understood in the 
appropriate disciplinary context. They are therefore misinterpreted and subsequently incorrectly 
contextualised before being misapplied throughout the field. By way of example, organisational 
learning theory has sometimes been dismissed, notably by Grissom42, as process-driven or focussed 
when more thorough examination of the literature reveals it is much more creative and dynamic.43 
Despite this reluctance to embrace it, tools, concepts and models with their roots in organisational 
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learning theory have permeated the field to such an extent that its terminology is now quite 
commonplace. However, without a thorough grounding in the originating theory (largely drawn from 
management studies) its concepts can easily be misunderstood and misapplied.  The concepts of 
single- and double-loop learning, for instance, feature quite prominently in discussions of how to 
improve military institutional learning but are often misrepresented  as competing learning 
processes or, worse, examples of good( double-) or bad (single-) learning when in fact they are 
neither. Organisational learning theory posits single-loop and double-loop learning as 
complimentary and essential elements of organisational learning; it is the understanding of the 
organisational culture and where each fits within its learning infrastructure that is important.44 
Subtly different concepts such as higher and lower-level learning and adaptive and generative 
learning are sometimes used interchangeably45 without a firm grasp of their nuances, creating yet 
more unnecessary conceptual confusion. 
Organisational theory in general has long been referenced in military innovation literature46 and the 
potential for more specific organisational (or institutional) learning theory to be of enormous value 
to military innovation studies was highlighted by Richard Downie nearly twenty years ago yet it 
remains underutilised.47 John Nagl’s comparative study of British and American approaches to 
counter-insurgency in Malaya and Vietnam48 was one of the first to use such theory systematically. 
More recently, Sergio Catignani49 has referenced it in his work on the modern British army and 
Abdulkader H Sinno has applied it to the warring factions in Afghanistan50 whilst Frank Hoffmann has 
defended the validity of organisational learning theory and argued for the development of a formal 
organisational learning model.51 Similarly, historical scholarship on military innovation often 
previously drew unconsciously on organisational learning theory but an exciting new wave of 
historical research on the relationships between formal and informal learning in military 
organisations is increasingly cognisant of the relevant theory.52 However, overall, the application of 
organisational theory to the field of military innovation remains uneven. It is imperative that 
concepts drawn from organisational theory are defined and used in the appropriate theoretical 
context across the field if they are to fulfil their obvious potential. 
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Even the comparatively straightforward interdisciplinary relationship between political scientists and 
historians has its problems. The danger of misapplied, misunderstood or inappropriate concepts 
undermining good empirical research should be obvious but then so too should the possibility that 
sound theory and promising concepts can be undermined when allied to contested history. Elizabeth 
Kier’s work is important because it is one of very few studies to ascribe genuinely independent 
explanatory power to organisational culture, using the case study of the evolution of French doctrine 
between the wars to do so,53 but historical analysis of the development of the French, British and 
German militaries between the wars has long been a rich, and much contested, vein of research.54 
Similarly, Nagl’s ground-breaking comparative study of British and American counterinsurgency in 
Malaya and Vietnam55  drew important conclusions about the role of military culture and the value 
of organisational learning theory that have informed much of the current literature on both but 
subsequent historical research has challenged the basic premise that the British military is simply 
culturally predisposed to perform well in such environments.56 Falsification always becomes more 
difficult in interdisciplinary research. Ironically, this can be exacerbated by the greater range of 
empirical research: the more case studies, the less selectivity when applying them. Further, as 
discussed, the cultural concepts drawn from anthropology and sociology are often far removed 
philosophically from positivist, empiricist IR approaches or historical methodologies. Thus, the 
danger of instrumentalising history57 is magnified by selectivity biases in appropriation of conceptual 
tools from other disciplines. 
None of the above should be interpreted as an attack on the multidisciplinary character of the field. 
Nothing could be further from the intent. However, the incorporation of theoretical literature from 
outside our own field of expertise without meaningful interaction with the scholars themselves is 
not good practice. At present, the dialogue is rather lop-sided with the apprentice doing most of the 
talking. The danger is that efforts to push the boundaries of the field actually undermine its 
credibility as we layer theory upon model upon concept all without accurate reference to the 
original disciplines. If we do, we are building on quicksand. Put another way, where a virtuous circle 
of multidisciplinary research should exist, there is a very real danger that a vicious one may take 
hold. 
Military innovation studies: a non-existent field? 
What’s in a name? Certainly in the case of military innovation, the name says a great deal. It gives 
form and meaning to the research and confers status upon it as part of a specific field of study. 
However, the above arguments beg a bigger question of whether military innovation is a scholarly 
field in its own right? There is a powerful argument to suggest that studying how militaries learn, 
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adapt and innovate is simply an important sub-set of research by, say, management studies, 
anthropologists, educators, psychologists or sociologists exploring organisational learning in 
particular or group dynamics in general. Studying how and why militaries innovate provides case 
studies for scholars from each discipline not the other way around. One could argue that the wider 
literature surrounding organisational learning and innovation applies to militaries in much the same 
way as it does to businesses, education or any large organisation and that a field that focuses 
exclusively on military innovation is in danger of simply obfuscating a well-established practice-
focussed theoretical literature. By this logic, the ‘schools’ within the field are really microcosms of 
research within their own most closely related disciplines not contributors to a single, coherent body 
of knowledge on military innovation: militaries are the objects not the subject.  
There is strength to this logic as there is to the related argument that ‘military innovation studies’ is 
a misnomer in itself. Most of what we characterise as the study of ‘innovation’ is simply the study of 
learning and most of that learning doesn’t result in ‘innovation’. The terminology ‘innovation’, 
‘adaptation’, ‘transformation’, ‘RMA’ is vital but over-emphasis upon it can skew the research 
agenda because it encourages an almost exclusive focus on ‘big’ moments when major reform is 
inspired by a new theory of victory, revolutionary technology or by failure in the crucible of war 
(often all inter-related). Asking why not reform or innovate when the pressure to do so was intense 
is sometimes done but rarely when the refusal to do so has been demonstrably the correct decision. 
Perhaps it is even worth re-visiting some of the case studies of failure to innovate in conflict to ask 
whether they truly were institutional failures in the greater scheme of things. Was the infamous 
quote by a senior officer about the Vietnam war “I’ll be damned if I permit the United States army, 
its institutions, its doctrine and its traditions to be destroyed just to win this lousy war”58 really as 
stupid as it seems when placed in the context of the Cold War focus on preparing for conventional 
warfare in Europe?59 Everyday routine, training, doctrine development in stable environments, 
military education and minor adaptation outside of war may seem dull but can be incredibly 
revealing about the ‘normal’ learning cultures of militaries because they reveal more fundamental 
characteristics. If we’re only really talking about the dynamics of individual and organisational 
learning within a military environment then that reinforces the argument about the lack of a 
separate field. In many ways, the dangers of misapplying concepts drawn from other disciplines are 
explicitly exacerbated by the notion that military innovation studies is in some way distinct. Placing 
military innovation in a wider context would overcome many of the above problems and confer 
genuinely multidisciplinary relevance upon the research. 
The counter, that a distinct (but, crucially, not discrete) field of study is required stems from the 
argument that militaries are unique because of the nature of their work and the fact that they do 
not have internal competitors. These factors and the potentially catastrophic consequences of 
failure make militaries peculiarly resistant to change and therefore highly distinctive organisations.60 
This is a powerful logic for the retention of a distinct intellectual identity but should be caveated. 
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First, all states with advanced bureaucratic apparatus have, by definition, a number of internal 
competitors for resource but also, more importantly, as our perception of security threats changes 
so competition for core military roles increases. The argument at its bluntest, that it is only militaries 
that close with and kill the enemy has always required qualification but now more so than ever. If 
combatting global radical extremism really is the ‘struggle of our generation’61 then the battlespace 
is so broadly defined that it raises all sorts of difficult questions about who is empowered to wield 
force on behalf of the state and how they do it. The role of western militaries relative to other 
security agencies is changing, perhaps more radically than ever before. Second, even if militaries 
remain unique organisations, there is a dichotomy in the innovation scholarship because it 
acknowledges the relevance of the wider social science literature on organisational theory and 
draws heavily on examples from public policy, business and education. Assumptions about 
resistance to change only sets militaries apart if they are unique in this regard but there is plenty of 
evidence to the contrary. A recurrent theme in public policy and management literature is 
organisational resistance to change and there are a wealth of studies of why it occurs and how to 
overcome it.62 Further, there are numerous case studies of military innovation that demonstrate not 
only great aptitude for dealing with change but considerable appetites for it: it’s therefore a myth 
that all militaries are resistant to change anyway.63 Separation thus adds a sense of importance but 
also insulates military innovation studies from theoretical and practical developments that would be 
of benefit. It further exacerbates intertextual issues by failing to engage the wider community. 
However, ultimately there remain compelling reasons for maintaining scholarly independence. 
Regardless of whether militaries are genuinely unique organisations, their importance makes them 
worthy of study in their own right. Despite rarely undertaking detailed studies of militaries, 
organisational theorists have a long tradition of citing military organisations as key case studies for 
understanding organisational dynamics more broadly. Ironically, many even contend that disciplined 
scholarly interest in organisations actually originates with studies of the military whilst happily 
avoiding conducting further research into them.64 As military organisations are oft cited but rarely 
studied outside of military sociology and military innovation, it is highly likely that research would 
fragment further and its relevance would be diminished should the field be subsumed within 
ostensibly parent disciplines. Here again, one can draw interesting parallels with, and lessons from, 
broader ‘macro-level’ IR debates  as ever-increasing multi-disciplinarity coupled with epistemological 
and ontological diversity have posed very similar questions about its own future as a discipline.65 
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Essentially, though it may have intellectual merit, the argument that military innovation is not a 
separate field and should instead be situated within wider discourses on organisational culture and 
organisational learning is only genuinely sound if an appetite exists to do so and it does not. Despite 
inherent contradictions and problematic terminology, the field of military innovation serves a very 
important purpose and has relevance well beyond its own boundaries. 66 To date, that relevance has 
largely been under-appreciated and retaining a distinct identity whilst recognising the limitations 
that it imposes would be a major step towards rectifying this. 
Military innovation studies: an evolving field 
In terms of the future research agenda, there are a number of fascinating avenues deserving greater 
attention as well as some obvious current omissions. 
 In terms of what is missing from the current scholarship, we still don’t have many good empirical 
studies of bottom-up learning in peace which may reflect a relative lack of bottom-up influence 
outside of war or a substantial gap in the literature. Further, the paucity of recent research into the 
relationship between internal and external drivers of change is another notable omission especially 
given its centrality to the debate about the dynamics of military innovation and learning. It seems 
incongruous that academic interest in inter-service and civilian-military explanatory models has not 
enjoyed a renaissance because the present security environment bears striking similarities to ones 
where these explanations of innovation were so convincing. More generally, research rarely 
attempts to discern the comparative learning cultures and capabilities of military organisations 
unless there is a common theme of successful or unsuccessful adaptation to a very specific challenge 
(usually a conflict with problematic characteristics or a new, game-changing technology). This is 
probably because such analyses of everyday organisational learning structures and processes are 
somewhat dry and uninspiring. However, they provide invaluable raw material for sophisticated 
comparative analyses of military cultures exposing their strengths, weaknesses and biases as 
learning organisations. As Murray and Watts have noted, intellectual honesty and critical 
engagement with sound empirical data on the part of militaries in peacetime may have important 
consequences in wartime67 so it is incumbent upon policy-orientated scholars to produce it and 
enlightened officers to use it. The lack of such studies may also be a reflection of a subconscious 
research bias inherent within the field: as the name suggests, ‘military innovation studies’ naturally 
focusses on the drivers of change and reform when, in reality, many of those drivers are inherent in 
the basic mechanics and cultures of organisational learning. With this in mind, it is encouraging to 
see scholarship that draws heavily on organisational learning theory making its way into the 
mainstream literature but this remains an under-researched area with enormous potential. 
To a certain extent the above gaps in the literature can be explained by the current predominance of 
cultural approaches but they also highlight a subtler, more profound issue. The development of the 
field over the 30 years since Posen’s seminal work may be more usefully seen as having produced 
several generations of related scholarship rather than competing schools per se. As a result, we have 
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seen little substantive debate between competing approaches because there have rarely been 
moments of genuine conflict as one challenges and supersedes another. The field is simultaneously 
richer and poorer for it. The positive effect has been to reinforce the tendency of military innovation 
scholars to seek common ground with those approaching the topic from different perspectives, and 
this has made the field remarkably inclusive. Overall, it is a very good thing to avoid the kind of 
theoretical polarisation so prevalent in the social sciences.68 However, a negative consequence of 
the lack of confrontation has been to downplay or ignore deeper philosophical differences between 
explanatory models. With regard to the IR-based innovation literature, the development of a more 
radically critical research agenda would be of huge benefit. As its epistemological foundations are 
furthest removed from traditional, positivist explanations it would naturally test the boundaries of 
what is ‘useful’ in a practical sense and what is compatible in a philosophical one. More specifically, 
challenging the orthodoxy that cultural approaches “by themselves, do not provide much additional 
explanatory power beyond existing structural theories”69 would be an enormous contribution to the 
theoretical well-being of the field. Even if the external threat environment remains the primary 
driver of innovation, cultural approaches argue that strategic culture has a huge influence on the 
perceived nature of a threat and organisational culture an equally significant impact upon the 
subsequent character of any resulting reforms. It therefore seems incongruous that culturalists are 
so hesitant about taking a leap of faith that culture can and does have considerable explanatory, 
even causal, power. As Charles King recently commented, small ‘c’ theoretical conservatism is a 
widespread problem within the broader discipline of international studies but a research 
environment where “being monumentally wrong is less attractive than being unimportantly right”70 
is never going to be conducive to genuinely ground-breaking scholarship. A more radical ‘critical 
turn’ within military innovation studies could provide the impetus for another burst of exciting new 
scholarship even if its direct applied value is more limited. 
Similarly, with regard to the multidisciplinary literature, we need to test our theories much more 
robustly, opening them to scrutiny from the disciplines that we are increasingly drawing upon. It is a 
great thing that sociologists, anthropologists, psychologists and historians are engaging with the field 
but political scientists have nevertheless largely been on receive, incorporating what we like, 
discarding what we do not. Intertextual problems between disciplines and reliance on received 
wisdom are real problems that undermine the credibility of what should be a naturally 
multidisciplinary field. Perhaps applying critical discourse analysis to the evolution of the corpus 
would be a rewarding and revealing exercise for some suitably qualified and enthusiastic colleagues? 
Certainly, if it is to continue to evolve conceptually and practically, it is long past time to expose 
what is going on to a wider academic audience and prepare to hear things that we may or may not 
like. In doing so, not only are the foundations of the field strengthened but the quality and relevance 
of its research is highlighted to the very disciplines that we are most keen to engage. At the very 
least, this will ensure that the field’s research remains credible but it is to be hoped that the effect is 
much greater, broadening its multidisciplinary horizons and, consequently, its multidisciplinary 
impact. 
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There is no doubt that military innovation is a vibrant field of study and the critiques offered in this 
article must be taken in that context. Over the past decade, the research agenda has broadened and 
a wealth of outstanding scholarship has emerged. Even more promising is that a new generation of 
scholars are not only receptive to a wide range of theoretical approaches to the study of military 
innovation but are naturally inclined to incorporate them within their work. Academics have 
benefited from the support of military practitioners who were themselves prompted to take a 
greater interest in their own organisational learning dynamics by the travails of Iraq and Afghanistan 
and the uncomfortable notion that they may not be prepared or suited for challenges to come. The 
wealth of empirical data on the drivers of innovation has expanded enormously as contemporary 
conflicts have been examined in detail and historical case studies have continued to grow. Further, 
the more regular application of different theoretical approaches to these studies has added depth 
and conceptual sophistication to the field which has become increasingly multidisciplinary in the 
process. In short, the field has changed and advanced over the ten years since Grissom’s review. 
However, a consequence of these largely positive developments is that military innovation studies is 
more congested than ever and has a strongly applied focus. In our rush to develop and apply new 
theories, or to enhance the old ones with wider social science research, there is a very real danger 
that we have come to a critical juncture without really perceiving it as such. Grissom, in championing 
corrective action within the field, cited Thomas Kuhn71 in the narrower sense of addressing the gap 
in bottom-up studies72 but perhaps it is time to reflect more deeply on the soundness of the 
theoretical foundations of the entire field. Has some of the conceptual terminology that now infuses 
the literature made its way into our own work without us really querying its validity? Even if we are 
using the right tools, do we fully understand them? To what extent have we sacrificed more 
challenging philosophical enquiry for applied utility? Crucially, where do we go next? 
It is important to ask these questions now because there is no guarantee that practitioner support 
will remain. Will the requirement to constantly question and reassess learning capability wane as 
conflicts that have defined Anglo-American thinking recede into the background? Historically, there 
has rarely been a strong impetus for militaries to focus on their qualities as learning organisations 
outside of war unless radical technological breakthroughs or observation of other conflicts provides 
a shock. Strategic shocks, however, usually only occur with the arrival of war. If interest does remain, 
it will most likely be in ‘innovation’ for the sake of ‘efficiency’, or, in plain English, cost-cutting. This is 
certainly an emergent theme in the UK where more regular defence reviews and continuing financial 
pressures are forcing senior MoD officials to encourage ‘innovation’ from their subordinates.73  
Budgetary constraints and austerity measures are, of course, important innovation drivers in 
themselves but require very different types of studies than the ones that currently dominant the 
field. Conversely, even if the Paris terrorist attacks of 13 November 2015 does prove to constitute a 
strategic shock, inspiring longer-term increases in defence spending and provoking greater direct 
Western intervention in Syria and elsewhere, the blatantly obvious requirement to re-think the 
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strategy, tactics and capabilities necessary to confront global terrorism more effectively will almost 
certainly require some degree of transformation within Western militaries. If military innovation is 
to continue to flourish as a credible, independent field, we need to be absolutely confident in its 
ability to answer the practical and conceptual challenges laid out above. It is vital that our academic 
field is sufficiently robust to ask the right questions in the right context and defend itself from 
accusations of lack of rigour. 
This article has examined the evolution of the field of military innovation studies in order to reflect 
upon just how far it has come in its relatively short history but, more importantly to offer a 
constructive critique of its current state in order to articulate a path forward. It has advocated 
multiple research pathways to greater disciplinary maturity. This is a crucial point because though 
the field can learn much from other related disciplines about how to draw its disparate strands 
together, it more urgently requires greater diversity and more radical research agendas to propel it 
forwards. Broadly speaking, there are three things that need to be done. First, we need to re-visit 
the contending schools of thought about military innovation and engage in a more robust debate 
about their relative merits as explanatory models. Their common roots in traditional positivist 
epistemology make comparative analysis relatively straightforward and the range of empirical 
studies that have already been undertaken gives us a wealth of data to interrogate and re-interpret 
through each lens. At present, the easy truce between each school is partly the result of their 
generational development and a consequent inferred mutual compatibility rather than rigorous 
comparative analysis. Projecting forward, such a debate will either demonstrate genuine mutual 
compatibility, thus increasing the sophistication of our understanding of the relationship between 
drivers of innovation, or it will expose deeper incompatibilities and inspire greater competition 
between them. If one studies the evolution of deterrence theory, one can see striking similarities 
from which we may learn lessons about how to draw disparate research strands together: the first 
step being critical engagement with each other’s work. As Jeffrey Knopf’s review of the evolution of 
deterrence theory illustrates, it, too, can be usefully categorised as developing in waves, each with 
very distinct characteristics; it draws on a number of related disciplines, often requiring specific 
technical knowledge; and it has sometimes under-theorised as a result of its policy-oriented 
character.74 Interestingly, the work of eminent scholars such as Lawrence Freedman has done much 
to synthesise different realist perspectives but has also inspired greater theoretical diversity by 
drawing on constructivist ideas as well.75 Regardless of whether deeper comparative analysis of the 
roots of military innovation studies produces a more parsimonious or more diverse theoretical 
literature, it can only enhance the academic credibility of the field. 
Second, we need to encourage cultural scholars to radicalise their research agendas in two opposite 
directions. The first direction is further towards positivist approaches but with an explicit agenda of 
challenging the subordinate status of cultural approaches. As discussed, it is already incongruous 
that the approach that currently dominates the research agenda of the field is simultaneously the 
one that has generated the least independent traction. A debate between the schools would be 
enriched enormously by the emergence of more assertive cultural explanations of innovation. The 
second, opposite, direction for cultural scholarship is to distance itself further from positivist 
approaches and more fully embrace a new critical turn. This recommendation is not about 
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engendering greater coherence within the field: it is about research diversity and the broader IR 
landscape. Critical analyses of specific national military cultures would undoubtedly deepen our 
understanding of the unique cultural dynamics of each individual case study and therefore have 
practical utility to positivist explanatory models. However, ‘overextending critical theory in a policy 
and practical direction… can also pose the challenge of sustaining critical theory’s power of 
critique’76 so must be treated with caution. Instead, the primary contribution would be to the wider 
IR field of critical security studies. How military culture is influenced by strategic culture, and vice 
versa, how it shapes innovation choices and how those choices, in turn, impact upon the dynamic of 
international security is a fascinating research avenue with the potential to make a major 
contribution to critical security studies. 
Third, much of this article has been concerned with the ways in which military innovation can better 
capitalise on its increasingly multidisciplinary character. It is a false assumption that the field is 
genuinely multidisciplinary at present and this is damaging to the long-term future of several 
exciting research agendas that draw heavily on other disciplines. At present, most scholarship is 
interdisciplinary (historical and political science) but often borrows liberally from other related fields 
without really understanding them. The sometimes excellent use but often ill-conceived abuse of 
concepts associated with organisational theory is perhaps the most obvious example of this but it is 
only one example. If nothing else, it is simply good housekeeping to tidy up the field’s lexicon and 
contextualise its theory appropriately. However, the requirement to engage more directly with 
related disciplines is about much more than just good housekeeping: it is a gold mine of ideas, 
conceptual tools, theories and empirical data that has a huge amount to offer. This is already evident 
in current efforts at multidisciplinary research which do show genuine promise but presently lack 
theoretical resilience as a result of a lack of contextualisation within parent disciplines. A concerted 
effort to engage scholars from other disciplines in our research projects is a prerequisite for the field 
to evolve. 
In summary, sound theory was, is and will remain fundamental to cutting-edge research. The applied 
bent of military innovation studies is integral to its character but it does increase the temptation to 
rush promising lines of academic enquiry into the mainstream debate. Very often, military 
practitioners want specific solutions to practical problems and because their questions broadly align 
with our own research interests we are all too ready to provide them with answers when we should 
be more circumspect. In reality, we cannot provide militaries with some kind of silver bullet for 
creating the perfect learning organisation because there is no such thing but we can produce world-
class research from which can be derived conceptual tools and empirical evidence for militaries to 
better understand themselves and the context within which they operate. Sophisticated 
multidisciplinary research into military organisational culture and the relative influence of 
endogenous and exogenous factors on innovation are enormous contributions in their own right. 
The obligation to produce theoretically sound scholarship informed by nuanced empirical evidence 
not only protects academic integrity but also increases the likelihood of appropriate practical 
application. Further, the addition of more overtly critical research strands would greatly enhance the 
likelihood of military innovation scholarship entering the wider consciousness of the disciplines from 
which it draws. In particular, there is potential to become more influential within International 
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Relations, where many of the theory challenges facing military innovation scholarship are being 
played out on a grander scale, and Management, where greater engagement with studies of the 
organisational dynamics of militaries would diversify the range of relevant public sector case studies 
and help offset an otherwise heavily business-orientated research base. In both cases, military 
innovation scholarship has a lot to give and even more to gain from greater theoretical ambition. 
Finally, the argument that military innovation studies is not really a field in its own right may have 
some intellectual merit but as no other disciplines are in any great hurry to stand up and take on 
responsibility for such a demonstrably important policy-relevant research area, then debate is, quite 
literally, academic. A healthy disrespect for the sanctity of the name and some creative licence with 
the field’s boundaries would be good things, encouraging an even broader research agenda and a 
more equal dialogue with related disciplines, but, without the unifying theme of military innovation, 
the actual research, regardless of its relevance, would be highly likely to fragment, wither and die. 
This would be a tragedy because whatever we call it, the study of military innovation and 
institutional learning is a genuinely multidisciplinary field with obvious applied relevance and 
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